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Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy. Or, sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Investors with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments or Enduring Intellectual Properties. Plus…buy my book about money and inflation. The title of the book is What’s Wrong with Money? The Biggest Bubble of All; order from Amazon here.

  • OK, CPI day at last. We get to find out if Powell meant “transitory” in the one-month sense (probably not) or in the 3-6 month sense (more likely).
  • After all we have had three weak core CPI figures in a row: 0.110% for Feb, 0.148% in March, 0.138% in April. Three 0.1%s, rounded.
  • Last month the culprit was used cars, -1.3% m/m, and Apparel at -0.8% m/m, the latter due to a methodology change. These are both short-term transitory, probably.
  • Meanwhile, the evidence that core is being infected these last three months by tail events is in the median CPI, which was +0.26%, +0.27%, and +0.20% the last 3 months.
  • Housing, on the other hand, remains strong, and this should continue for a bit; Medical Care remains weak with pharma especially (+0.1% y/y)…and I think that is “longer-term transitory” that should start to retrace higher.
  • I am expecting a return to normalcy, not so much a rebound, in autos and apparel. But that should be enough to hit the consensus figures of 0.21% on core, 2.09% y/y.
  • Longer-term, the fact that interest rates have fallen so far suggests that the small rebound we have seen over the last year and a half in money velocity may have trouble extending.
  • So I think Median probably peaks late this year or early next, though I don’t expect it to fall off a cliff, either, in this recession.
  • Grabbing coffee. Back in 11 minutes.
  • So maybe a liiiiiittle more transitory than we thought! Core +0.11% m/m, +2.00% y/y.
  • Last 12 months. The comp is easier next month, but none of the last 4 months would have exceeded it anyway!

  • Apparel basically flat m/m, which is approximately what I expected…-3.06% y/y though, which includes the methodology change.
  • CPI-Used Cars and Trucks was again down sharply m/m. -1.38%. That’s unlikely. Pushes y/y to +0.28%, Black Book has it about 1% above that.

  • Housing: OER +0.26% m/m, Primary Rents +0.24%. Actually those aren’t far from the trends (y/y in each case declined a couple of hundredths, to 3.34% and 3.73% respectively), but last month had been chippier.
  • Medical Care (and then I’m going to take a few minutes and dig deeper on some of these)…Medicinal Drugs (pharma) went into deflation. -0.11% m/m, -0.82% y/y. Chart in a moment. Doctor’s Services roughly unch, but only 0.30% y/y. Hospital Services bounced a bit, 1.30% y/y.
  • Even with the bounce, Hospital Services is lower than two months ago, 3 months ago, etc. One year ago it was 4.70% y/y. Hospital Services is the largest component of the Medical Care subindex.
  • Here is the y/y chart for drugs. Now, it’s very hard to measure this because there is tremendous dispersion in consumer costs for prescription drugs…massive differences based on which outlet, formulary, insurance, etc you have. Doing a lot of work on this. Sooo…

  • this is the y/y picture for NONprescription drugs, which are much easier to measure. Basically no chg. So either prescriptn drug mkt is getting much more competitive (I doubt it), there is some change in collection method (possible), or a shift showing up as change.

  • there is no lower-level index for drugs so we can’t really dig any deeper on that unfortunately. But it’s significant, not only for the CPI of course but for consumers generally (and the budget deficit) if health care costs really ARE slowing in a permanent way.
  • CPI – College Tuition and Fees, essentially unch at 3.81% vs 3.86% y/y. But well off the lows.

  • Now what does that last picture look like…oh, yeah, the S&P Target Tuition Inflation Index (my baby).

  • Core inflation ex-housing down to 1.04%, the lowest level since February 2018. Still nowhere near the lows, nowhere near deflation, and with lots of transitory stuff in it.

  • Core goods prices still in deflation, -0.2%. But lagged effect of the dollar’s 2017 selloff should just now be starting to wash into the core goods data. And we still haven’t seen the tariff effect yet. So this is still to come and the reason I don’t think we’ve peaked yet.

  • WEIRD: Biggest declines on the month were used cars & trucks (-15.3% annualized), Leased cars & trucks (-13.8%). Biggest gainers: Car and Truck Rental (+26.5%), Public Transportation (+24.8%).
  • Early estimate for Median CPI is +0.21% m/m, making y/y 2.81%. So, again, it’s a tails story.
  • Sorry, didn’t calculate the sheet for y/y. Should be 2.76% y/y for median, down from 2.80%.
  • Here is m/m Median CPI. Notice there’s really no major slowdown here. It’s been pretty steady and rising slightly y/y for a while. Nothing below 0.2% m/m since last August.

  • OK, four pieces and then we’ll sum up. Piece 1 is food and energy.

  • Piece 2 is core goods. As I said, I expect this to turn back higher. This is where you find Used Cars and Apparel…so transitory stuff is big here. This is also where tariffs fall heaviest.

  • Piece 3 is Core Services less Rent of Shelter. Same story here: “What is up with medical care?” It may be that since consumers under the ACA end up paying out of pocket for a much larger share, they’re bargaining harder. That could be why it feels so much worse than this.

  • Finally, rent of shelter – same old same old. No deflation while this remains steady as a rock.

  • So, in sum. I do think that Powell is right in focusing on the “transitory” inflation slowdown. Better measures, such as Median (see below for Median vs core), show no significant slowdown yet.

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I am a statistics snob. It unfortunately means that I end up sounding like a cynic most of the time, because I am naturally skeptical about every statistic I hear. One gets used to the fact that most stats you see are poorly measured, poorly presented, poorly collected, or poorly contexted. I actually play a game with my kids (because I want them to be shunned as sad, cynical people as well) that I call “what could be wrong with that statistic.” In this game, they have to come up with reasons that the claimed implication of some statistic is misleading because of some detail that the person showing the chart hasn’t mentioned (not necessarily nefariously; most users of statistics simply don’t understand).

But mostly, bad statistics are harmless. I have it on good authority that 85% of all statistics are made up, including that one, and another 12.223% are presented with false precision, including that one. As a result, the only statistic that anyone believes completely is the one they are citing themselves. So, normally, I just roll my eyes and move on.

Some statistics, though, because they are widely distributed or widely re-distributed and have dramatic implications and are associated with a draconian prescription for action, deserve special scrutiny. I saw one of these recently, and it is reproduced below (original source is Ray Dalio, who really ought to know better, although I got it from John Mauldin’s Thoughts from the Frontline).

Now, Mr. Dalio is not the first person to lament how the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer, or some version of the socialist lament. Thomas Piketty wrote an entire book based on bad statistics and baseless assertions, after all. I don’t have time to tackle an entire book, and anyway such a work automatically attracts its own swarm of critics. But Mr. Dalio is widely respected/feared, and as such a simple chart from him carries the anti-capitalist message a lot further.[1]

I quickly identified at least four problems with this chart. One of them is just persnickety: the axis obviously should be in log scale, since we care about the percentage deviation and not the dollar deviation. But that is relatively minor. Here are three others:

  1. I suspect that over the time frame covered by this chart, the average age of the people in the top group has increased relative to the average age of the people in the bottom group. In any income distribution, the top end tends to be more populated with older people than the bottom end, since younger people tend to start out being lower-paid. Ergo, the bottom rung consists of both young people, and of older people who haven’t advanced, while the top rung is mostly older people who have Since society as a whole is older now than it was in the 1970s, it is likely that the average age of the top earners has risen by more than the average age of the bottom earners. But that means the comparison has changed since the people at the top now have more time to earn, relative to the bottom rung, than they did before. Dalio lessens this effect a little bit by choosing 35-to-64-year-olds, so new graduates are not in the mix, but the point is valid.
  2. If your point is that the super-wealthy are even more super-wealthier than they were before, that the CEO makes a bigger multiple of the line worker’s salary than before, then the 40th percentile versus 60th percentile would be a bad way to measure it. So I assume that is not Dalio’s point but rather than there is generally greater dispersion to real earnings than there was before. If that is the argument, then you don’t really want the 40th versus the 60th percentile either. You want the bottom 40% versus the top 40 percent except for the top 1%. That’s because the bottom of the distribution is bounded by zero (actually by something above zero since this chart only shows “earners”) and the top of the chart has no bound. As a result, the upper end can be significantly impacted by the length of the upper tail. So if the top 1%, which used to be centi-millionaires, are now centi-billionaires, that will make the entire top 40% line move higher…which isn’t fair if the argument is that the top group (but not the tippy-top group, which we all agree are in a category by themselves) is improving its lot more than the bottom group. As with point 1., this will tend to exaggerate the spread. I don’t know how much, but I know the direction.
  3. This one is the most insidious because it will occur to almost nobody except for an inflation geek. The chart shows “real household income,” which is nominal income (in current dollars) deflated by a price index (presumably CPI). Here is the issue: is it fair to use the same price index to deflate the incomes of the top 40% as we use to deflate the income of the bottom 40%? I would argue that it isn’t, because they have different consumption baskets (and more and more different, as you go higher and higher up the income ladder). If the folks at the top are making more money, but their cost of living is also going up faster, then using the average cost of living increase to deflate both baskets will exaggerate how much better the high-earners are doing than the low-earners. This is potentially a very large effect over this long a time frame. Consider just two categories: food, and shelter. The weights in the CPI tell us that on average, Americans spend about 13% of their income on food and 33% on shelter (these percentages of course shift over time; these are current weights). I suspect that very low earners spend a higher proportion of their budget on food than 13%…probably also more than 33% on shelter, but I suspect that their expenditures are more heavily-weighted towards food than 1:3. But food prices in real terms (deflated by the CPI) are basically unchanged over the last 50 years, while real shelter prices are up about 37%. So, if I am right about the relative expenditure weights of low-earners compared to high-earners, the ‘high-earner’ food/shelter consumption basket has risen by more than the ‘low-earner’ food/shelter consumption basket. Moreover, I think that there are a lot of categories that low-earners essentially consume zero of, or very small amounts of, which have risen in price substantially. Tuition springs to mind. Below I show a chart of CPI-Food, CPI-Shelter, and CPI-College Tuition and Fees, deflated by the general CPI in each case.

The point being that if you look only at incomes, then you are getting an impression from Dalio’s chart – even if my objection #1 and #2 are unimportant – that the lifestyles of the top 40% are improving by lots more than the lifestyles of the bottom 40%. But there is an implicit assumption that these two groups consume the same things, or that the prices of their relative lifestyles are changing similarly. I think that would be a hard argument. What should happen to this chart, then, is that each of these lines should be deflated by a price index appropriate to that group. We would find that the lines, again, would be closer together.

None of these objections means that there isn’t a growing disparity between the haves and the have-nots in our country. My point is simply that the disparity, and moreover the change in the disparity, is almost certainly less than it is generally purported to be with the weakly-assembled statistics we are presented with.

[1] Mr. Mauldin gamely tried to object, but the best he could do was say that capitalists aren’t good at figuring out how to share the wealth. Of course, this isn’t a function of capitalists. The people who decide how to distribute the wealth in capitalism are the consumers, who vote with their dollars. Bill Gates is not uber-rich because he decided to keep hundreds of billions of dollars away from the huddling masses; he is uber-rich because consumers decided to pay hundreds of billions of dollars for what he provided.

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Many, many years ago (27, actually) I wrote a paper on how a tariff on oil actually has some beneficial effects which needed to be balanced against the beneficial effect that a lower oil price has on economic growth. But since the early 1990s until 2015 or so I can count on the fingers of one hand how many times the issue of tariffs came up in thoughts about the economy and markets. To the extent that anyone thought about them at all, it was to think about how lowering them has an unalloyed long-term positive effect. Which, for the most part, it does.

But the economics profession can sometimes be somewhat shamanistic on the topic of tariffs. Tariffs=bad; time for the next chapter in the book. There is much more complexity to the topic than that, as there is with almost any economic topic. Reducing economics to comic-book simplicity only works when there is one overwhelmingly correct idea, like “when demand for a good goes up, so does the equilibrium price.” The end: next chapter.

Tariffs have, though, both short-term and long-term effects. In the long-term, we all agree, the effects of raising tariffs are deleterious. For any given increase in money and velocity, we end up with lower growth and higher inflation, all else equal. It is important to realize that these are largely one-time effects although smeared out over a long period. That is, after equilibrium is reached if tariffs are not changed any longer, tariffs have no large incremental effect. It is the change in tariffs that matters, and the story of the success of the global economy in terms of having decent growth with low inflation for the last thirty years is largely a story of continuously opening trade. As I’ve written previously, this train was just about running out of track anyway so that we were likely to go back to a worse combo of growth and inflation, but reversing that trend would lead to significantly worse combinations of growth and inflation in the medium-to-long term.

In the short-term, however, tariffs can have a positive effect (if they are expected to remain) on the tariff-imposing country, assuming no retaliation (or even with retaliation, if the tariff-imposing country is a significant net importer). They raise employment, and they raise the wage of the employed. They even may raise the real wage of the employed if there is economic slack. The chart below shows the y/y change in manufacturing jobs, and ex-manufacturing jobs, for the last 40 years. Obviously, the manufacturing sector has been shrinking – a story of increased productivity, but also of trade liberalization as manufacturing was offshored. The Obama-era work programs (e.g. “Cash for Clunkers”) temporarily reversed some of that differential decline, but since 2016 – when we got a new President – manufacturing payrolls growth has caught up to non-manufacturing. That’s not a surprise – it’s the short-term effect of tariffs.

The point is that tariffs are a political winner in the short-term, which is one reason I think that people are overestimating the likelihood that “Tariff Man” is going to rapidly concede on trade and lower tariffs. If the Administration gets a clear “win” in trade negotiations, then I am sure the President is amenable to reversing tariffs. But otherwise, it doesn’t hurt him in the heavy manufacturing states. And those states turn out to be key.

(This is a relative observation; it doesn’t mean that total payrolls will rise. The economic cycle still has its own momentum, and while tariffs can help parts of the economy in the short term it doesn’t change the fact that this cycle was very long in the tooth with lots of imbalances that are overdue for correction. It is no real surprise that employment is softening, even though it is a lagging indicator. The signs of softening activity have been accumulating for a while.)

But in the long run, we all agree – de-liberalizing trade is a bad deal. It leads among other things to bloat and inefficiency in protected sectors (just as any decrease in competition tends to do). It leads to more domestic capacity than is necessary, and duplicated capacity in country A and country B. It promotes inefficiency and unbalanced growth.

So why, then, are investors and economists so convinced that putting tariffs or subsidies on money has good (or even neutral) long-term effects? When the Fed forces interest rates higher or lower, by arbitrarily setting short-term rates or by buying or selling long-term bonds – that’s a tariff or a subsidy. It is protecting interest-rate sensitive sectors from having interest rates set by competition for capital. And, as we have seen, it leads in the long run to inefficient building of capacity. The Fed evinces concern about the amount of leverage in the system. Whose fault is that? If you give away free ice cream, why are you surprised when people get fat?

The only way that tariffs, and interest rate manipulations, have a chance of being neutral to positive is if they are imposed as a temporary rebalancing (or negotiating) measure and then quickly removed. In the case of Federal Reserve policy, that means that after cutting rates to address a temporary market panic or bank run, the central bank quickly moves back to neutral. To be clear, “neutral” means floating, market-determined rates where the supply and demand for capital determines the market-clearing rate. If investors believed that the central bank would pursue such a course, then they could evaluate and plan based on long-term free market rates rather than basing their actions on the expectation that rates would remain controlled and protective.

It is no different than with tariffs. So for central bankers criticizing the trade policy of the Administration, I say: let those among you who are without sin cast the first stone.

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There is a lot of buzz around inflation these days. Some people are explaining why we shouldn‘t worry and some people why we should, but regardless – it’s a topic of conversation for the first time in ages. And despite this (or rather, because of it, because I find myself very busy these days), I haven’t written in a long time despite the fact that I have a few things worth writing about. I keep trying, though.

Today I am cheating a bit and taking a column from the quarterly inflation outlook that my company (Enduring Investments) just sent to customers. But I think it is fair to include it here, because the musing was provoked by a recent exchange I had on Twitter while doing my monthly CPI analysis/tweetstorm (follow me @inflation_guy).

As readers know, I tend to focus on Median CPI, rather than Core CPI, as my forecast target variable. The reason is that price changes are rarely distributed randomly. If they were, then the choice of core or median CPI would be irrelevant because they would normally be the same, or roughly the same. But when a distribution has long tails, the ends of the distribution exert a lot of pressure on the average and so median can differ substantially from the mean simply because one tail is much longer than the other even if most of the distribution is similar.

Consider a playground see-saw and imagine that on one side of the see-saw are seated several small children. Think of the “average” of the see-saw system as the point where the see-saw balances. Well, there are lots of ways to balance the system with weight on the other side of the see-saw: a very large weight close to the fulcrum will do it. But the further away from the fulcrum one places the weight, the smaller the weight necessary to balance the scale. As Archimedes said, “give me a lever long enough, and a place to stand, and I can move the world.” The point is that an influence far from the middle of the distribution can have a very significant effect on the average because it is far away from the distribution:  the effect on the mean is (weight * distance from the mean).

Example: the mean of 98% of a distribution is 12. The remaining 2% of the distribution is 28. The weighted average is [(12 * 0.98) + (118 * .02)] / (0.98 + 0.02) = 14.12.  That little 2% caused the mean to go from 12, without the tail, to 14.12 with the tail…a movement of 17.7%! Notice that .02 * 118 = 2.12, which is the amount the mean moved. And if that tail is 228 rather than 118, the mean goes to 16.32. So you see, the length of the tail matters. In both cases, the median was 12, which I would argue is a better indicator of the “central tendency” of the distribution.

(If the distribution is approximately normal, then the tails roughly balance and so the mean and median are about the same. But many economic indicators are not normally distributed, especially ones like income or home prices which are bound by zero on one side. Thus, for many economic series the median, rather than mean, is a better measure. Even though CPI is not bound by zero, it is not normal because prices are not set in a continuous process but instead to have jump-discontinuities.)

The chart below, which I often show in my CPI tweetstorm, shows the see-saw of CPI, where I’ve broken up the index into its lowest-level components and placed those weights on a number line representing the most-recent year-over-year changes. The height of the bar indicates the amount of the basket that sits in that bucket. As you can see, nearly half of the CPI is inflating faster than 3% (which is why Median CPI is 2.8%), and the mode of the distribution is between 3.5% and 4.0%. But because of the far left tail, the mean – which is what core CPI is – is just barely over 2%. Because we have much longer left-hand tails than right-hand tails, the average is biased lower relative to median.

But is this “normal?” Some people have occasionally accused me of picking Median CPI because it tends to be higher, and so the number makes it look like there is more inflation. If the spread were constant, then it would be a bit academic which we chose as the forecast variable, and in fact Core would have a better claim since after all, as consumers purchasing that basket we are in fact paying the average price and not the median.

In fact, though, I think that the tendency of core in recent years to trade below median really is its own interesting story about how prices evolve. If we have 3% inflation, it does not mean that all prices are going up at 3% per year, 0.75% per quarter, 0.25% per month. The price of any given good doesn’t move smoothly but rather episodically, sporadically, spastically. When we are in a disinflationary period, or anyway a low-inflation period, what is happening is that those episodes involve periods of slower prices and “transitory factors” that tend to be on the downside.[1] In that sense, it may be that the Fed, and me/Enduring, both err when they try to look through ‘transitory factors’ because transitory factors may be part of the process. The argument for that perspective is similar to the argument I myself make about why “ex-items” measures make sense when you are looking at an individual company’s earnings but not when you look at the aggregate earnings of the economy. Because bad stuff, or “items,” are always happening to someone somewhere. You can throw them out of any one analysis but if you own the index, you’ll get some of those “items.” You just don’t know from where. Perhaps inflation is the same way.

However, I should point out that median inflation is not always below core. The chart below shows median and core CPI going back to 1983, which is when the Cleveland Fed’s series for Median CPI begins. Notice that from 1983 until 1993, Median CPI was generally lower than core CPI. In 1994, this changed and it has been the opposite ever since.

The year 1994 is significant because that is also the year that most models for inflation that are calibrated on pre-1994 data break down (or, conversely, it is the year prior to which a model calibrated on post-1994 data breaks down). I have written previously about this phenomenon and the fact that the Fed believes this is when inflation expectations abruptly became “anchored,” whatever that means – but *I* believe that this discontinuity is when globalization kicked into high gear with an explosion in the number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. It strikes me as plausible that these items are related. When markets are suddenly opened to global competition, affected markets will suddenly show slower price appreciation due to the pressure from that competition (and the replacement of high-cost domestic goods with lower-cost imports). But which market is currently being affected will not stay constant, but change over time. In other words, I think the fact that core has been persistently below median for a long time is a symptom of the globalization “dividend.”

If I am right, and if if I am also right about the arrow of globalization changing direction, then it follows that core and median might flip positions at some point over the next couple of years. And then the “transitory effects” will be mostly on the high side.

[1] It could also be indicative of a bias from the measurers that their improved methods are always looking for lower inflation – not in the “the BLS is making up this *@&$^” sense but in the sense that for lots of reasons the CPI appears to be overstated because of technical details about the functional form, the way measurement errors happen, etc. And so researchers may spend more time looking for ways that inflation is overstated. I don’t think that research bias is actually much of a problem. But I figured I ought to mention that that is one possible interpretation.

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Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy. Or, sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Investors with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments or Enduring Intellectual Properties. Plus…buy my book about money and inflation. The title of the book is What’s Wrong with Money? The Biggest Bubble of All; order from Amazon here.

  • Happy(?) tariff day! With new tariffs imposed overnight, important to remember that the IMPORTANT effect on prices is not the near-term bump (which is small), but the fact that the disinflation of last 25y was possible because of trade liberalization.
  • Also of course happy CPI day. We get the number in a few minutes. Here are a few pre-thoughts.
  • Last month, core CPI was +0.148% m/m and 2.042% y/y, which both rounded down and looked like big misses.
  • They weren’t really big misses, and at least some of that was due to a plunge in Apparel prices that was probably methodology-related (at least, that’s what the econs had anticipated so let’s take as an initial guess that they were right).
  • Rents, the biggest and most important (and slow-moving) piece, were firm – firmer than I’ve been expecting in fact.
  • But used cars was weak, along with Doctor’s services…along with Apparel, in general there was a lot of “left-tail stuff.”
  • The left-tail nature of last month’s figure was illustrated by the fact that MEDIAN, the measure I focus on, was +0.27% to 2.85% y/y…another post-crisis high.
  • Today, the consensus is for 0.2%/2.1% on core inflation. We would have to get something below 0.12% m/m to keep core from bumping to 2.1%, and any kind of firm number (>0.21%) could pop us back to a rounded 2.2%.
  • That’s because last April was pretty weak. In fact four of the next 5 months were under 0.2% a year ago, so the comps will be easier for core.
  • Core CPI +0.14%, slightly weaker than expected but rounding down to 0.1% again. Y/Y was 2.07%, so it did round up.
  • Soft-looking but as noted earlier, base effects made it hard to maintain a 2.0% on core.
  • Last 12 m/m core cpis.

  • OK, the number is stronger than it looks. Used Cars very weak, -1.31% m/m which is crazy. Doesn’t look anything like the private surveys. Apparel -0.76% m/m again, -2.9% y/y. That’s not an accurate depiction of what’s happening.
  • Because mainly of those two pieces, core goods went to -0.2% from flat. With tariffs rising, that doesn’t pass the sniff test. Core services, though, rose to 2.8% y/y. Primary rents were +0.45% m/m, 3.76% y/y, and OER +0.33%.
  • Rent of primary residence. This is surprising, but important.

  • Here is OER. With the Shiller index softening, many had expected rents to follow. But chippy wages are helping to keep a bid here, for now at least.

  • There’s a real problem using home price indicators to forecast rents, because your model for that was built over a qtr-century in which wages & inflation were low and stable. If wages rise, then maybe home prices will lag rents – but we don’t know because we haven’t seen it.
  • OK on to other things. Medical Care rose to 1.92% y/y vs 1.72% last mo. Every month it’s something different m/m tho. It was Pharma. Then Doctors’ Services last month. This month Dr Svcs bounced a little but Hospital Svcs -0.46% m/m. And Hosp Svcs is lgst part of Med Care.
  • Core ex-housing was unchanged at 1.1% y/y. That’s actually surprising considering the drag from apparel and used cars.
  • I may have been wrong on Used Cars being very surprising though. Guess there must be some uncaptured seasonal issue because y/y actually rose (meaning last April was also awful). And this is right on model. So I retract my concern about Used Cars.

  • Biggest category drops on the month: Men’s and Boy’s Apparel (again), Footwear, Processed Fruits and Veggies, and Used Cars and Trucks. Biggest rises: Motor Fuel, Lodging Away from Home, Jewelry and Watches, and Medical Care Commodities (pharma)
  • I skipped ahead to look at my guess for Median. It’s going to be a solid 0.2%, although that will cause the y/y to drop to “only” 2.80%. At least, that’s my estimate…won’t be reported for hours.
  • College Tuition and Fees at 3.86% y/y compared with 3.84% y/y.
  • Health Insurance doing its health insurance thing again.

  • I mean, on housing it’s not ALARMING how fast it’s growing. It isn’t way above our model or anything. It just looks bad compared to what people were expecting given the S&P Corelogic Case/Shiller index.

  • In green is the case/shiller y/y. So you can see people why were expecting a slowdown in rents. But you can also see that…it’s not a very good fit.

  • That’s not quite fair b/c there’s no lag incorporated…home prices lead rents by ~21 months, so really we shouldn’t even see that impact for a while. Here it is lagged. Still not a good fit though and at times (2011, 2014) the direction of shiller didn’t match even lagged.

  • Just a quick market comment…here’s the median CPI vs 10y inflation swaps. It’s going to be very hard to get much more bearish on long-term inflation swaps unless we see SOME signs that inflation is ebbing. So far, no signs at all.

  • Four pieces. First Food & energy:

  • Next, core goods. Our model has this headed higher, although not huge – maybe 0.5% or 1.0%. Recent deceleration is unsustainable especially in a fractious-trade world.

  • Core Services less Rent of Shelter. No real change this month. If this is going to go up, it is going to be because medical care rises. To this end, it’s interesting that the previous spikes in Health Care Insurance (shown earlier) preceded spikes in other Medical Care.

  • I wonder if the fact that Insurance is a residual means that when it is spiking, it means we’re just capturing prices in the wrong place until the survey catches up. Worth investigation.

  • Finally, Rent of..
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Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy. Or, sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Investors with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments or Enduring Intellectual Properties. Plus…buy my book about money and inflation. The title of the book is What’s Wrong with Money? The Biggest Bubble of All; order from Amazon here.

  • CPI in under 10 minutes. Gentlefolk, start your engines!
  • Start with the consensus: this month economists are calling core 0.18% m/m, and 2.1% y/y.
  • Remember that last month, core was 0.11%, in a downside surprise driven by pharmaceuticals and autos, while Rents were actually somewhat bubbly again.
  • However, Median inflation turned out to be 0.26%, pushing y/y to basically tie the post-crisis highs at 2.77%.
  • That should lead you to suspect that there were some ‘tail effects’ last month that could be reversed this month. So that would make me marginally bullish this number, all else equal.
  • Now, there’s talk about the fact that the BLS is changing its collection method for Apparel to use a direct feed from retailers rather than manual price-sampling.
  • Some people think the change in the method of collecting Apparel prices should depress Apparel, but I’m not really sure why that would be so unless there was some systematic bias in collections pushing prices higher.
  • If so, I’m not sure it’s showing. Apparel is -0.76% y/y. In any event, Apparel is only 3% of CPI so effect should be quite small. And apparel recently has been weak. So I’m not too worried about that. Famous last words, I guess.
  • Core prints at 0.1%, 2.0% y/y. But that’s not as weak as it looks. It was actually something like 0.148%, whereas market was looking for 0.18% or so…y/y is 2.04%. So both barely rounded down.
  • last 12 months’ core CPI chart. Just bumping sideways. We ought to be back to 2.1% y/y next month, as we drop off a weak April 2018 print.

  • Well, trust the bow-tied set, I suppose. Apparel -1.94% m/m, -2.2% y/y. I guess those manual price checkers were pushing prices up, after all. (?)
  • And CPI for Used Cars and trucks, second month in a row, weak at -0.38%. That’s lower than Black Book (which has been a much better fit than Manheim since last year’s methodology change) suggests it should be.

  • But more importantly and lastingly – rents remained firm, with primary rents +0.42% m/m and OER +0.32% m/m. That keeps OER stable y/y and raises Primary rents to 3.68% y/y.
  • Primary rents y/y. Not sure if this is an aberration because I don’t track market rents. Seems unusual for late in the cycle, but wage growth has been strong and supports this dynamic. But seems a bit strong.

  • Pharma bounced, rising to -0.39% y/y from -1.19% y/y. But the downtrend doesn’t seem terribly damaged.

  • Core ex-housing drooped a little bit, not surprisingly given the breakdown. Core ex-shelter is 1.10%, down from a 1.54% November high but still well above the 2017 lows of 0.53%.
  • Interestingly, like last month where Used Cars fell and New Cars gained, the same thing happened this month. Used cars & trucks went to 0.44% y/y vs 1.11%; New cars to 0.72% from 0.29%. A little odd, but just wiggles.
  • Although Medicinal Drugs re-accelerated slightly, Professional Services (doctors)) decelerated to 0.39% from 0.97% y/y, as did Hospital and related services (1.94% from 2.12%). As a result, Medical Care WOULD have decelerated but for Health insurance.
  • Always worth a reminder: health insurance in the CPI is a residual, since CPI measures only the portion of medical care that individuals pay directly. But it rose to 9.06% y/y from 7.66%.

  • This chart is why we like to ignore core and focus on median. Clearly a lot of left-tail stuff going on.

  • Primary rents y/y. Not sure if this is an aberration because I don’t track market rents. Seems unusual for late in the cycle, but wage growth has been strong and supports this dynamic. But seems a bit strong.
  • So, having said that…my early guess at median CPI is for +0.27%, which would push median to 2.85%, clearly the highest since the end of the crisis. We will have to wait a couple of hours for the official figure.
  • Four pieces. Not much change this month except in the last piece. Here’s Food & Energy.

  • Piece 2: Core goods. Dragged down by used cars, pharmaceuticals. Our models have this still going higher so I think these are one-off effects.

  • Core services less rent-of-shelter. Doctors, hospitals dragging this down. Be wary if Medicare-for-all proposals start to gain traction; if they do then I’d suspect doctors and hospitals would start to raise prices before their prices get fixed or cut.

  • Part 4 is Rent of Shelter. I’ve been saying forever that we’re not getting deflation because this isn’t about to fall off a cliff. On the contrary, it’s actually moved above our ensemble model.

  • So, here’s our ensemble model for OER. Primary rents are actually a [little] bit above our model. As you can see, we’re expecting a gradual slackening of rental pressures. BUT…

  • …but our model based on income (not shown) rather than home prices is actually calling for higher rents. You can argue that higher wages have helped produce these higher rents.

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One intriguing recent suggestion I have heard recently is that the “Excess” reserves that currently populate the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve aren’t really excess after all. Historically, the quantity of reserves was managed so that banks had enough to support lending to the degree which the Fed wanted: when economic activity was too slow, the Fed would add reserves and banks would use these reserves to make loans; when economic activity was too fast, the Fed would pull back on the growth of reserves and so rein in the growth of bank lending. Thus, at least in theory the Open Markets Desk at the New York Fed could manage economic activity by regulating the supply of reserves in the system. Any given bank, if it discovered it had more reserves than it needed, could lend those reserves in the interbank market to a bank that was short. But there was no significant quantity of “excess” reserves, because holding excess reserves cost money (they didn’t pay interest) – if the system as a whole had “too many” reserves, banks tended to lend more and use them up. So, when the Fed wanted to stuff lots of reserves into the system in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and especially wanted the banks to hold the excess rather than lending it, they had to pay banks to do so and so they began to pay interest on reserves. Voila! Excess reserves appeared.

But there is some speculation that things are different now because in 2011, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recommended (and the Federal Reserve implemented, with time to comply but fully implemented as of 2015) a rule that all “Systematically Important Financial Institutions” (mainly, really big banks) be required to maintain a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) at a certain level. The LCR is calculated by dividing a bank’s High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) by a number that represents its stress-tested 30-day net outflows. That is, the bank’s liquidity is expressed as a function of the riskiness of its business and the quantity of high-quality assets that it holds against these risks.

In calculating the HQLA, most assets the bank holds receive big discounts. For example, if a bank holds common equities, only half of the value of those equities can be considered in calculating this numerator. But a very few types of assets get full credit: Federal Reserve bank balances and Treasury securities chief among them.[1]

So, since big banks must maintain a certain LCR, and reserves are great HQLA assets, some observers have suggested that this means the Fed can’t really drain all of those excess reserves because they are, effectively, required. They’re not required because they need to be held against lending, but because they need to be held to satisfy the liquidity requirements.

If this is true, then against all my expectations the Fed has, effectively, done what I suggested in Chapter 10, “My Prescription” of What’s Wrong with Money? (Wiley, 2016). I quote an extended section from that book, since it turns out to be potentially spot-on with what might actually be happening (and, after all, it’s my book so I hereby give myself permission to quote a lengthy chunk):

“First, the Federal Reserve should change the reserve requirement for banks. If the mountain will not come to Mohammed, then Mohammed must go to the mountain. In this case, the Fed has the power (and the authority) to, at a stroke, redefine reserves so that all of the current “excess” reserves essentially become “required” reserves, by changing the amount of reserves banks are required to hold against loans. No longer would there be a risk of banks cracking open the “boxes of currency” in their vaults to extend more loans and create more money than is healthy for an economy that seeks noninflationary growth. There would be no chance of a reversion to the mean of the money multiplier, which would be devastating to the inflation picture. And the Open Markets Desk at the Fed would immediately regain power over short-term interest rates, because when they add or subtract reserves in open market operations, banks would care.

“To be sure, this would be awful news for the banks themselves and their stock prices would likely take a hit. It would amount to a forcible deleveraging, and impair potential profitability as a result. But we should recognize that such a deleveraging has already happened, and this policy would merely recognize de jure what has already happened de facto.

“Movements in reserve requirements have historically been very rare, and this is probably why such a solution is not being considered as far as I know. The reserve requirement is considered a “blunt instrument,” and you can imagine how a movement in the requirement could under normal circumstances lead to extreme volatility as the quantity of required reserves suddenly lurched from approximate balance into significant surplus or deficit. But that is not our current problem. Our current problem cries out for a blunt instrument!

“While the Fed is making this adjustment, and as it prepares to press money growth lower, they should work to keep medium-term interest rates low, not raise them, so that money velocity does not abruptly normalize. Interest rates should be normalized slowly, letting velocity rise gradually while money growth is pushed lower simultaneously. This would cause the yield curve to flatten substantially as tighter monetary conditions cause short-term interest rates in the United States to rise.

“Of course, in time the Fed should relinquish control of term rates altogether, and should also allow its balance sheet to shrink naturally. It is possible that, as this happens, reserve requirements could be edged incrementally back to normal as well. But those decisions are years away.”

If, in fact, the implementation of the LCR is serving as a second reserve requirement that is larger than the reserve requirement that is used to compute required and “excess” reserves, then the amount of excess reserves is less than we currently believe it to be. The Fed, in fact, has made some overtures to the market that they may not fully “normalize” the balance sheet specifically because the financial system needs it to continue to supply sufficient reserves. If, in fact, the LCR requirement uses all of the reserves currently considered “excess,” then the Fed is, despite my prior beliefs, actually operating at the margin and decisions to supply more or fewer reserves could directly affect the money supply after all, because the reserve requirement has in effect been raised.

This would be a huge development, and would help ameliorate the worst fears of those of us who wondered how QE could be left un-drained without eventually causing a move to a much higher price level. The problem is that we don’t really have a way to measure how close to the margin the Fed actually is; moreover, since Treasuries are a substitute for reserves in the LCR it isn’t clear that the margin the Fed wants to operate on is itself a bright line. It is more likely a fuzzy zone, which would complicate Fed policy considerably. It actually would make the Fed prone to mistakes in both directions, both over-easing and over-tightening, as opposed to the current situation where they are mostly just chasing inflation around (since when they raise interest rates, money velocity rises and that pushes inflation higher, but raising rates doesn’t also lower money growth since they’re not limiting bank activities by reining in reserves at the margin).

I think this explanation is at least partly correct, although we don’t think the condition is as binding as the more optimistic assessments would have it. The fact that M2 has recently begun to re-accelerate, despite the reduction in the Fed balance sheet, argues that we are not yet “at the margin” even if the margin is closer than we thought it was previously.

[1] The assumption in allowing Treasuries to be used at full value seems to be that in a crisis the value of those securities would go up, not down, so no haircut is required. Of course, that doesn’t always happen, especially if the crisis were to be caused, for example, by a failure of the government to pay interest on Treasuries due to a government shutdown. The more honest reason is that if the Fed were to haircut Treasuries, banks would hold drastically fewer Treasuries and this would be destabilizing – not to mention bad for business on Capitol Hill.

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Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy. Or, sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Investors with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments or Enduring Intellectual Properties. Plus…buy my book about money and inflation. The title of the book is What’s Wrong with Money? The Biggest Bubble of All; order from Amazon here.

I usually post these the day of CPI but I was traveling and didn’t get to do so. These were my tweets in the immediate aftermath of the CPI report.

  • About 15 minutes to CPI. Today’s stream-of-consciousness will be a little more relaxed since I’m at a conference in Florida at the moment!
  • As for the number today, here are some thoughts.
  • We’ve recently begun to see some reduction in pressure from truckload rates upstream. Not down, but rising more slowly. Bottlenecks in overland are easing somewhat. Higher prices are still passing through but less alarm about it.
  • Housing price increases have also been slowing. Again, we’re talking second-derivative stuff; they aren’t falling nationwide. Rents are loosely related to prices, so I don’t think we’ll see much downward pressure there yet, but it’s a meme at the moment.
  • Wage growth remains strong, but wages lag inflation so that’s not much illumination.
  • There is decent momentum in some other categories, and…tariffs. Remember we don’t need tariffs to get worse growth/inflation outcomes than the last 20 years; we just need less forward progress on trade. And we have that for sure! (Again with the second derivatives??)
  • I’ve been expecting an interim peak in median CPI later in 2019. It’s not here yet, and I might still be wrong about that and see it climb further. Inflation after all is a process with momentum. But that’s my current expectation.
  • However, I ALSO don’t expect that when median CPI eventually turns lower that it will fall anywhere close to the prior lows. I think we’ve begun a long-term cycle of higher highs and higher lows in inflation.
  • Now, money growth is picking up again, and higher rates over the last year imply higher velocity going forward. But globally we have more negative-rate debt, so that’s dampening. But the macro pressures on inflation remain to the positive side.
  • For today, the Street sees 0.2% on core, dropping y/y to 2.1% because drop off a difficult +0.3% comp from last January. The January figure sees a number of interesting cross currents. I suspect there’s a smidge of upside risk to this number, but I have low confidence on that.
  • We will see, in 5 minutes.
  • ok, 0.24% on core CPI, a bit higher than expected and BARELY kept core from rounding lower to 2.1%, even dropping off the strong Jan 2018

  • 15% is core to 2 decimal places y/y.
  • Primary rents 0.31% m/m after 0.21%, but y/y still declined to 3.43% vs 3.47%. As I said, rents only loosely related to prices and rent slowing has still been only at the margin.
  • Owners’ Equiv Rent was 0.27% vs 0.22% last, with y/y unchanged at 3.21%. So the big chunk of housing was reasonably strong. Actually Lodging Away from Home, which had a very large jump last month, had another decent rise this month. It’s only 0.9% of CPI but no “AirBnB” effect.
  • So the macro interesting thing is that core services declined to 2.8% y/y, thanks to the gradually slowing housing I think, while core goods rose to 0.3%.
  • That’s the highest core goods since 2013. Our models think this is headed up to 0.5% before flattening, but … tariffs. Our models don’t include them. This is the underlying pressure.

  • OK, so Apparel is 0.11% y/y, basically unchanged. Jump this month, but that looks seasonal. Medical care declined to 1.90% y/y vs 2.01%. Recreation rose to 1.36% vs 1.14%.
  • There was some chatter that a change the BLS made in how it accounts for quality change in some communications categories could drag down the CPI like cell phones did last year, but it’s a much smaller effect. Education/Communication was 0.31% y/y vs 0.21% last month.
  • Sorry for the interlude…some tech glitch. Anyway…picking up. Education was 2.72% y/y vs 2.62% last month; Communication was -1.68% vs -1.76%. So the rise in Education/Communication was from both parts.
  • Not so in Medical Care. Medical Care Commodities were -0.28% vs -0.50%; Med Care Services 2.45% vs 2.64%. So the overall small decline in Medical Care (1.90% vs 2.01% y/y) was basically entirely from the “Hospital and Related Services” category (2.44% vs 3.64%).
  • The other Medical Care categories – medicinal drugs, Professional Services, and Health Insurance – all rose. But they were counterbalanced by the Hospital part.
  • Median this month might be really interesting. Rough calculation suggests that a housing sub-category that Cleveland Fed calculates might be the median category so it’s hard to tell. But I think Median y/y will drop from 2.77% to 2.64%. Might even be worse.
  • Core ex-housing fell to 1.39% from 1.51%. So, there’s definitely some signs of softness here even though Core Goods is providing upward pressure. Working on the 4-pieces breakdown now.
  • Core ex housing chart. Sorry not too many charts today. Little harder to do remotely.

  • OK the four pieces. For those new to this analysis, I break CPI into these four pieces, each roughly 1/4 of CPI (19%-33%).

  • Here are the four pieces, from most-volatile to least-volatile. Part 1 is Food and Energy. Clearly holding down headline CPI but this is why we look through it. Look at that y axis!

  • Part 2 is Core Goods. With the trade frictions, this is presently the most interesting piece. Even if the tariffs implemented by the Administration are dropped, we’ve still stopped the forward trade momentum of the last quarter century. So this bears watching.

  • Core Services less Rent of Shelter. A lot of this is Medical Care, and while it looked like we might be breaking the long downtrend recently…maybe not so much.

  • Finally, rent of shelter. Off the highs, but our models don’t have it dropping seriously. Housing prices still rising, albeit more slowly. And rents, while high relative to wages, are now getting a following wind from rising wages. I suspect this will meander.

It seems, from reading the other post-mortems, that some people saw this as a very strong number. It really wasn’t…slightly stronger than expected. But I guess it depends on your state of mind coming in. I’ve thought the underlying run rate of core CPI was something like 0.22% per month, and with seasonal issues in January thought we’d be a touch higher than consensus. I suppose if you thought inflation was falling off a cliff you might have expected something much weaker. The composition, too, was solid but unspectacular. Again, if you thought rents were about to collapse then you were surprised that it was only down a little on a y/y basis. The core goods rise is important, but again – not unexpected.

So is inflation running “hot”? Well, if you think 2.2% is hot, I suppose so. But Median CPI also declined on a y/y basis, as have wages recently. Don’t get me wrong, I think inflation is still rising and probably will for most of this year. But it’s not shooting higher and if I were at the Fed and if I believed what they believed, I wouldn’t be alarmed by this number (I am not at the Fed and I don’t believe what they believe, for the record).

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The rumor today is that China is going to resolve the trade standoff by agreeing to balance its trade with the US by buying a trillion dollars of goods and services over the next four years. The Administration, so the rumor goes, is holding out for two years since that will look better for the election. They should agree to four, because otherwise they’re going to have to explain why it’s not working.

I ascribe approximately a 10% chance that the trade balance with China will be at zero in four years. (I’m adjusting for overconfidence bias, since I think the real probability is approximately zero.) But if it does happen, it is very bad for our financial markets. Here’s why.

If China buys an extra trillion dollars’ worth of US product, where do they get the dollars to do so? There are only a few options:

  1. They can sell us a lot more stuff, for which they take in dollars. But that doesn’t solve the trade deficit.
  2. They can buy dollars from other dollar-holders who want yuan, weakening the yuan and strengthening the dollar, making US product less competitive and Chinese product more competitive globally. This means our trade deficit with China would be replaced by trade deficits with other countries, again not really solving the problem.
  3. They can use the dollars that they are otherwise using to buy financial securities denominated in dollars, such as our stocks and bonds.

The reality is that it is really hard to make a trade deficit go away. Blame the accountants, but this equation must balance:

Budget deficit = trade deficit + domestic savings

If the budget deficit is very large, which it is, then it must be financed either by running a trade deficit – buying more goods and services from other countries than they buy from us, stuffing them with dollars that they have no choice but to recycle into financial assets – or by increased domestic savings. So, let’s play this out and think about where the $500bln per year (the US trade deficit, roughly, with the rest of the world) is going to come from. With the Democrats in charge of Congress and an Administration that is liberal on spending matters, it seems to me unlikely that we will see an abrupt move into budget balance, especially with global growth slowing. The other option is to induce more domestic savings, which reduces domestic consumption (and incidentally, that’s a counterbalance to the stimulative growth effect of an improving trade balance). But the Fed is no longer helping us out by “saving” huge amounts – in fact, they are dis-saving. Inducing higher domestic savings would require higher market interest rates.

The mechanism is pretty clear, right? China currently holds roughly $1.1 trillion in US Treasury securities (see chart, source US Treasury via Bloomberg).

China also holds, collectively, lots of other things: common equities, corporate bonds, private equity, US real estate, commodities, cash balances. Somewhere in there, they’ll need to divest about a trillion dollars’ worth to get a trillion dollars to buy US product with.

The effect of such a trade-balancing deal would obviously be salutatory for US corporate earnings, which is why the stock market is so ebullient. But it would be bad for US interest rates, and bad for earnings multiples. One of the reasons that financial assets are so expensive is that we are force-feeding dollars to non-US entities. To the extent that we take away that financial inflow by balancing trade and budget deficits, we lower earnings multiples and raise interest rates. This also has the effect of inducing further domestic savings. Is this good or bad? In the long run, I feel reasonably confident that having lower multiples and more-balanced budget and trade arrangements is better, since it lowers a source of economic leverage that also (by the way) tends to increase the frequency and severity of financial crack-ups. But in the short run…meaning over the next few years, if China is really going to work hard to balance the trade deficit with the US…it means rough sledding.

As I said, I give this next-to-no chance of China actually balancing its trade deficit with us. But it’s important to realize that steps in that direction have offsetting effects that are not all good.

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