Recall NAFO making fun of a Russian blogger who asked “What air defense doing” after Ukraine attacked Saky airfield in August? In Topwar.ru this week, Roman Skomorokhov essentially asked “What Russian Army doing?” He stridently criticizes the high-level decision-making and conduct of Russia’s war on Ukraine. He perpetuates the tripe about the Russian Army not actually being allowed to wage war. This, despite evidence of tens of thousands of war crimes. Skomorokhov’s biggest question, however, is why Moscow isn’t using its entire million-man regular army in the war. Why aren’t mobilized reserv ..read more

Russia’s war on Ukraine has been paralyzing. It’s paralyzing because Russian media outlets covering the Russian Federation Armed Forces have spent 166 days doing two things. Either spewing Kremlin propaganda about the “special military operation.” Or not saying or writing anything true about the Russian military for fear of prosecution, fines, and prison time for disseminating “fake” information or “discrediting” the armed forces. Needless to say, it’s crimped the “bread and butter” of these posts. Be that as it may, Oleg Falichev wrote last week for NVO about Russia’s faltering war on Ukrain ..read more

One Vladimir Turovskoy published an op-ed on Topwar.ru (aka Voyennoye obozreniye) on April 8.  Topwar often has useful information on military issues. Sometimes not. It’s a mixed bag.  Turovskoy’s article is a right-wing critique of Putin’s “special military operation” against Ukraine.  While anti-war protesters are arrested and fined for “discrediting” the army, this sharp criticism of Putin’s campaign and his regime is not banned. The piece makes various points about the military’s operational failures to date and the West’s economic war to “destroy” Russia. Turovskoy directs ..read more

A Telegram post about Bucha from London-based political scientist and scholar Vladimir Pastukhov. The marauding of the Russian Army in Ukraine is shifting from the periphery of public attention to the center. This was powerfully facilitated by pictures of Bucha liberated from its liberators, which forced many people outside Russia (where they don’t show any pictures except happy ones) to ponder how Russian troops in Ukraine are really carrying out a very special operation. An international investigative commission will deal with the humanitarian-legal aspects of this operation without any do ..read more

Read and consider a long thread posted yesterday by @igorsushko about the planning and conduct of Putin’s war on Ukraine. It’s based reportedly on the insights of an FSB analyst who was involved at some level in preparing for the Russian Army’s invasion of Ukraine. Obviously, many say this account isn’t genuine, it’s a fabrication, etc. Who can know? It’s the fog of war. Everyone has to decide whether they believe it’s authentic. From this observer’s perspective, it rings true. What follows are the best parts edited and consolidated. Putin’s plan to invade Ukraine was kept secret from everyo ..read more

Putin signed out his list of military promotions yesterday. For the MOD a little unusual, no three-star promotions, just five two-stars, but 26 one-stars. One newly-minted general-lieutenant is Aleksandr Sanchik, commander of the Eastern MD’s 35th CAA. He is likely with his units now located on Ukraine’s borders. First deputy commander of Pacific Fleet submarine forces Eduard Mikhaylov also got a second star. He likely will command Pacific (or maybe Northern) Fleet subs one day. The Central MD’s chief of air and air defense forces Valeriy Belkov was elevated to general-lieutenant. More comple ..read more

Mikhail Khodarenok’s article about the course of a possible Russian war on Ukraine appeared in NVO last week. He’s a knowledgeable and realistic analyst. And he’s a Russian patriot given his military career and service in the General Staff. But he’s one who says what the Kremlin doesn’t want to hear, but needs to. Khodarenok points to the danger of Russia’s overconfidence about military action even with its significantly revamped and upgraded forces. His piece resembles what many Western observers write when the U.S. contemplates war. But, in Russia, Khodarenok is a lonely voice. War on Ukrain ..read more

Despite Defense Minister Shoygu’s announcement of “higher than planned” pay increases for Russian servicemen in 2022 and 2023, military salaries will still lag woefully behind cumulative consumer inflation amounting to more than 90 percent since 2012. At the December 22 MOD Collegium, Sergey Shoygu said RF servicemen will get higher than planned pay increases in 2022 and 2023. Conveniently for him, he didn’t say what the original plan was, so Russian officers and soldiers will simply take what the MOD gives and be grateful. No one (outside the MOD or RF government) will know if it’s more or n ..read more

Annual December promotions used to mark the adoption of the RF’s first post-Soviet constitution on December 12, 1993. The two are less often linked now, perhaps because an increasing number of basic citizen’s rights exist only on paper. Maybe also because Putin rammed through the constitutional amendment restarting his “two term” limit and allowing him to be president until 2036 — basically 36 years in power (Medvedev’s interlude notwithstanding). Be it as it may, we have the December military promotions list. In a new wrinkle, Defense Minister Shoygu had 14 of 24 promotees on hand to accept n ..read more

Here’s a new OB page. Have been expanding, updating, and rearranging it. But there’s always more to do ..read more