What surprised me most about this opinion was the very last line. The opinion itself is savage. Savage. It affirms the imposition of $10,000 in discovery sanctions against a law firm -- The Vanderpool Law Firm (in Seal Beach) -- notwithstanding the firm's argument that it can't be sanctioned because it substituted out of the case before the motion to compel was filed. The opinion is undeniably correct on the merits: Lawyers and law firms can be sanctioned for, as here, the underlying (sanctionable) discovery responses that led to the motion to compel even if they substitute out before the resu ..read more

Justice Corrigan authors a powerful opinion that holds that it's not permissible for the police to conduct a Terry stop just because someone's in a high crime area and pretending to tie his shoe behind a car in order to avoid the police, and Justice Evan authors an equally powerful concurrence (joined by a majority of the Court) that highlights the racial implications of a rule that assumes that the "normal" response to a police encounter is to welcome and/or consent to it. All of which are worthy of incredibly careful consideration. My only thought upon reading both opinions is that, whi ..read more

I readily concede that I know only a tiny bit about what it takes to become an attorney in California if you've graduated from an unaccredited law school. I know that you've got to pass the "baby bar" at some point after your first year -- and then, ultimately, the actual bar exam -- but that's about it. Today, however, I learned that you apparently have to pass the baby bar within the first 18 months or so of completing your first year of law school. If you do, then you're good to go, and you get credit for all the classes you took in the interim before passing (e.g., your second and third ye ..read more

The California Supreme Court should grant review of this Court of Appeal opinion. Even if it's right. Whether you're convicted of murder, and thus spend most or all of the rest of your life in prison, should not depend on which particular appellate panel you happen to draw. The question presented is the required mental state for a murder conviction when you commit an assault. Let's say, as here, you punch someone in the head in a regular old street fight, and they ultimately die as a result. The evidence suggests that you certainly didn't intend to kill them, but nonetheless that you want ..read more

This seems like an easy decision with which to comply -- as long as you're aware of it beforehand. Can a judge order someone to pretrial mental health diversion? Yes. Of course. Can a judge order restitution? Same answer: Yes. Clearly. But if you want to order restitution, you've got to do so before the two-year (or whatever) mental health diversion is over and you're about to dismiss the charges. Not after. So holds the Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court. Again: An easy decision to follow, as long as you know of it. Which now everyone (hopefully) does ..read more

This opinion of the California Supreme Court -- in response to the Ninth Circuit's certified question -- is unanimous, and reading Justice Evans' opinion, you can potentially see why. She does a very good job of exploring the interplay between the various statutory provisions here, some of which were added by the Legislature and others of which were added by the electorate Proposition 139. Forthrightly, I'm not certain at all that the voters were, in fact, fully "aware" of the way the California treated various prisoners when it passed the underlying initiative (in fact, I'm extremely confiden ..read more

I'm fairly confident that this is all about pretext. But given that the Supreme Court is fine with allowing pretextual traffic stops, my sense is that the police officers here did an admirable job of keeping things calm and respectful. As, I might add, did the defendant. Here's how the traffic stop went down: "In July 2020, Officers Dorin Buchanan and Patrick Marshal pulled over Victor Ramirez after witnessing him speed in a residential neighborhood, fail to stop at a stop sign, and not use a turn signal. Before pulling Ramirez over, one of the officers recognized him as a gang member bas ..read more

I'm not exactly sure why Justice Wiley decided to publish this opinion, since it seems fairly clearly to make no new law and merely holds -- consistent with legions of precedent -- that in employment cases, in which you have to exhaust your administrative remedies first before you can sue, it's not okay to list one set of facts in your administrative petition and an entirely different set of facts in your subsequent lawsuit (e.g., claims for sex discrimination at one location in the administrative petition but claims of sexual harassment at a different location in the lawsuit). Can't do that ..read more

Two thoughts sprung to my mind when I read this opinion: (1) What an incredible waste of taxpayer money when a county (here, Santa Cruz County) sues a city (here, the City of Santa Cruz) over whether the city or county is responsible for a public road (here, Capitola Road) that allegedly got undermined by drainage pipes and needed to be repaired. It's a nine-count complaint (!) for $1.2 million in which the County is suing the City for (1) dangerous condition of public property, (2) trespass, (3) nuisance, (4) waste, (5) indemnity and contribution, (6) removal of lateral and “subadjacent” (sic ..read more

Judges Forrest and Thomas disagree on whether the law is "clearly established" that it's not okay for police officers to use continuous force (e.g., by kneeling on someone's back) to someone who's on the ground and handcuffed, particularly when (as here) he is telling the officer that he's unable to breathe. But can we all at least agree that there are a disturbing number of cases, both in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere, involving that pretty much identical fact pattern? (FWIW, Judge Thomas' dissent quotes a prior Ninth Circuit opinion that says "The officers—indeed, any reasonable person—sh ..read more