Industrial production continues to rise, while February monthly GDP erased January’s decline. Figure 1: Nonfarm Payroll employment from CES (bold blue), civilian employment (orange), industrial production (red), personal income excluding current transfers in Ch.2017$ (bold green), manufacturing and trade sales in Ch.2017$ (black), consumption in Ch.2017$ (light blue), and monthly GDP in Ch.2017$ (pink), GDP, 3rd release (blue bars), all log normalized to 2021M11=0. Source: BLS via FRED, Federal Reserve, BEA 2023Q4 3rd release, S&P Global Market Insights (nee Macroeconomic Advisers, IHS Ma ..read more

From IMF WEO ..read more

From Rashad Ahmed today: Source: Rashad Ahmed ..read more

Filed today by Rep. Moskowitz ..read more

Since 2021M01, the CPI has risen 17.3% (log terms). By comparison, chained CPI and HICP have risen by approximately 16.5%. The PCE deflator has risen only 14.4% by March 2024 – but these are prices of goods and services produced, not of prices faced by consumers. Figure 1: CPI (blue), HICP (green), chained CPI (tan), PCE deflator (red), supercore CPI (pink), all in logs 2021M01=0. HICP and chained CPI seasonally adjusted by author using Census X-13/X-11. NBER defined peak-to-trough recession dates shaded gray. Source: BLS, Eurostat, BEA via FRED, BLS, NBER, and author’s calculations.   ..read more

Here’s a graph that I constructed, in preparing to teach the open economy component of Macro Policy: Figure 1: US Net International Investment Position as ratio to GDP (blue, left scale), Balance on Primary Income as ratio to GDP (tan, right scale), both in %. NBER defined peak-to-trough recession dates shaded gray. Source: BEA via FRED, NBER, and author’s calculations. For many years, the US has been a net debtor to the rest of the world (assets – liabilities < 0), and yet income from the rest of the world has exceeded payments to the rest of the world, consistently since 2007. Either we ..read more

Reader Bruce Hall observes: China’s growth rate is projected to be about twice that of the US. While this is true, it’s useful to have context when discussing growth rates in an advanced economy (US) vs. an emerging market economy (China). Figure 1: US real GDP y/y growth (blue), Chinese (red). Projection period indicated by light green shading. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2024 database, and author’s calculations. In other words, US growth is pretty hot if trend growth is 2%. Chinese growth is looking pretty lackluster (projected 2024 y/y growth is not matching 5%). (Note: the ..read more

Economics Dept and CROWE presents: Kim Ruhl‘s slides: US-China trade: From the Cold War to the Trade War A combination of “Trade War and Peace” and “Trade Policy Dynamics” Slides // Non-technical slides   ..read more

It’s of some interest to see how polls and prediction markets are viewing the presidential race, and how this links with economic sentiment. First polls and sentiment. Source: TheHill, accessed 4/17/2024. Source: U.Michigan via FRED, TradingEconomics, accessed 4/17/2024. Now, a prediction market. Below, I show PredictIt odds for Biden vs. Trump (omitting RFK Jr.), for the last 90 days (corresponding to the period after the green lines in the top two figures). Source: PredictIt, accessed 4/17/2024.   ..read more

More upbeat than WSJ April survey mean: Figure 1: GDP (bold black), April WSJ survey (light blue), GDPNow (4/15) (red square), NY Fed (light green square), St. Louis Fed (blue inverted triangle), IMF April 2024 WEO (chartreuse triangles), all in bn.Ch.2017$ SAAR. Source BEA via FRED, Philadelphia Fed, Atlanta Fed, NY Fed, St. Louis Fed via FRED, IMF, and author’s calculations. Below is the entire set of forecasts from the WEO, on a q4/q4 basis. Forecasts are based on the level of exchange rates prevailing in February 2024. See Table A1 of the data appendix of the WEO for assumptions. 2024 Q4 ..read more