It’s only 20 months since the WTO last had a ministerial conference.  Usually, it’s at least two years between meetings but the previous conference was delayed by COVID, so there’s an element of making up for lost time.  “MC13” – the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference since the WTO’s establishment in 1995 – will take place in Abu Dhabi from 26-29 February. The agenda is extremely broad and there are only three and a half days for Ministers to achieve consensus.  The less controversial items have been largely dealt with through assiduous preparation in Geneva but, as is usual on s ..read more

Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate by Mary Elise Sarotte Professor Salotte’s book is necessary reading to understand one of the most controversial diplomatic and military endeavors of the late 20th century: NATO’s eastward expansion.  Published just few months before Russia’s invasion to Ukraine, Sarotte’s fascinating and engaging recollection of events, discussions and meetings between Western leaders and their Soviet – and later Russian – counterparts, make this book extremely timely for understanding the complexity behind one of the greatest t ..read more

Digital trade has grown very fast in recent years, not least because of Covid-19 and its push to do online business. The pandemic, according to one news story, “has accelerated digitalization and is serving as a catalyst for the growth of non-physical goods trade” (Bloomberg, 2020).  While all this is true, digital globalization has been on the rise for years. In fact, global digital exports of services deliverable over the internet – such as R&D, information, computer, and other business services as well as charges for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) – together show an average gro ..read more

The Russian economy is in disarray. The Russian ruble is in free fall; sales of foreign exchange are banned; and foreign companies are fleeing Russia day by day. In a previous blog we showed the high level of economic interdependence between Russia and the rest of the world, particularly with the EU which accounts for more than one third of Russian exports and imports. A lot has been said about Europe’s dependency on Russian oil and gas, and this dependency remains an acute problem. However, in macro terms, the Russian economy is much more dependent on the EU than vice versa. Financial and eco ..read more

In recent months, it has become evident how the US sanctions against Chinese technology suppliers seem inconsistent, especially when it comes to the critical 5G infrastructure and participation in related standard-setting. Whereas Huawei – the principal target of US policy – has undeniably weakened. But the Chinese 5G behemoth never supplied any of the US mobile networks – and as such, it never posed a direct security threat to the US. Instead, the sanctions have indirectly helped Chinese state-owned and military-linked companies like ZTE who benefitted from bullish purchases an ..read more

Introduction On December 3rd, DiDi, the world’s largest ride-hailing app, announced it would delist from New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and move its listing to Hong Kong, heeding the calls from the Chinese authorities. DiDi, with its 600 million users (which is more than six times larger than Uber), is by far the world’s largest ride-hailing app and calls itself ‘the world’s largest depository data. As such, it has been subject to several onerous investigations in China since its initial public stock offering (IPO), which had put the company under the purview of US financial authorities. Inevi ..read more

This piece was co-authored with Robin Baker, a Research Associate at the London School of Economics. US sanctions against Chinese 5G have been inconsistently applied for the supply of critical technologies and participation in standard-setting. Huawei may have been weakened, but the sanctions have also helped Chinese state-owned companies like ZTE and defence contractors. 1. Background The last five years have been characterized by the geopolitical divergence of mobile communications networks. The release of Meng Wanzhou (Huawei CFO and daughter of the company’s founder) may seem like a turnin ..read more

Radio access networks account for just 4% of operators’ cost. So how did it become a public policy discussion? In one of the more surprising news to come out of Sweden, we read that the CEO of Ericsson was lobbying on behalf of Huawei against Sweden’s decision to block Chinese network equipment. Ericsson’s support for its competitor seems quite counterintuitive, and some have noted how the Wallenberg family – who the Chinese media call “Rockefellers of Sweden” that holds a controlling stake in Ericsson – need to tap into the Chinese investment opportunities. What the China-critics miss (o ..read more

« C’est avec beaucoup d’humilité que je viens aujourd’hui dans ce lieu essayer de vous parler de francophonie ».[1] Si je reprends, avec encore plus d’humilité, cette première phrase du tout récent discours du Président Emmanuel Macron à l’Institut de France sur la francophonie (21 mars 2018), c’est que je suis un de ces Coréens qui défend l’importance de la France en Corée. Mais voilà, la Corée devrait bientôt perdre la Médiathèque de l’Institut Français de Séoul dont seulement une partie du fonds sera transférée à l’Alliance française de Daejon, où moins de 3% des Coréens vivent, s ..read more

Our forthcoming policy brief on Open RAN explores the increasing politicisation of the 5G rollout around the world. In particular, the radio access networks (RAN) that make up the radio installations in the field (and the majority of the hardware costs) are the centre of a political discussion. Exclusions of foreign vendors in China, Europe, the US, Japan and many other places, raises concerns about higher costs due to an increasing market concentration amongst equipment vendors. While the policy brief carefully examines the technology and the logic behind Open RAN, the question of market conc ..read more