On March 26, 2024, the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, Serbia, hosted a lecture by Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, entitled “Contemporary Russia’s Foreign Policy.” During the lecture, Lukyanov discussed a variety of topics related to Russia’s foreign policy and its evolution over time, including the country’s relationship with the West, its self-perception, and its impact on international affairs. He also explored the relationship between Russia and China and other relevant issues. Watch the lecture The Institute of European Studies (IES) is ..read more

It has been said more than once that the contradictions between Russia and the West, in addition to material reasons, were also fuelled by differences in views on the nature of international politics: while Russia had a realist vision, the West maintained a liberal one. The debate on European security has also seen different and irreconcilable ideas. On the Russian side, there was a realistic demand not to see the West’s hostile (at that time – potential, now – real) military infrastructure move closer to Russian borders, and not to let them turn Russia’s neighbours into a springboar ..read more

The place that Russia should occupy in Europe has long been a contentious topic. Faced with a hostile Russia, many in the West who implicitly consider the EU system and liberal democracy to be synonymous with Europe itself assert that Russia is “leaving Europe”. By contrast, others take Russia’s military operation in Ukraine as evidence that Moscow still wants the West to accord it the privileges and status of a great power in the European security order. Civilizational or normative definitions of Europe aside, one thing is undeniable: Russia remains the most populous and one of the most power ..read more

Strategic stability is usually understood as the absence of incentives for a nuclear-armed power to launch a massive first strike. Typically, it’s viewed primarily in military-technical terms. The reasons why an attack may be contemplated are usually not taken into account. This idea emerged in the middle of the last century, when the USSR had achieved military-strategic parity with the US and the Cold War between them had entered a “mature” phase of limited confrontation and some predictability. The solution to the problem of strategic stability was then seen in the constant mainten ..read more

For citation, please use: Leksyutina, Ya.V., 2024. Chinese Policy in Central Asia in the Estimation of Chinese Experts. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(2), pp. 141–154. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-141-154   Over the last few years, Central Asia’s political, economic, and geopolitical landscape has undergone fundamental changes and even shake-ups. The countries of the region have acquired new leaders, reconfigured their political systems, reoriented their development strategies (including in the direction of greater economic openness towards neighbors and the world), and adjusted their ..read more

For citation, please use: Timofeev, I.N., Arapova, E.Y. and Nikitina, Yu.A., 2024. The Illusion of “Smart” Sanctions: The Russian Case. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(2), pp. 156–178. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-156-178   Targeted Sanctions. What’s in a Name? Targeted sanctions have become a major instrument of economic coercion in contemporary international relations. Conventional wisdom links such a prominent shift with two drivers (Drezner, 2015, pp. 757-758). The first is the humanitarian price of untargeted sanctions, which includes drastic human suffering, a rise in corruption ..read more

For citation, please use: Pukhov, R.N., 2024. From “Special” to “Military”. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(2), pp. 112–126. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-112-126   Failed “Operation Danube” We can retrospectively conclude that Russia initially planned an operation that was primarily “special” and only secondarily “military,” as it intended to achieve its goals without large-scale hostilities or organized armed resistance. Future historians will have to explain why Moscow considered this feasible, even though the Ukrainian army had been waging a continuous “minor” war in Donbass since 20 ..read more

For citation, please use: Lukyanov, F.A., 2024. The Present Rooted in the Past. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(2), pp. 5–8. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-5-8   Thirty years ago, in 1994, the Western Group of Forces—the main Soviet, and then Russian, military contingent in Europe—completed its pullout from Eastern Europe. The agreement on its withdrawal had been reached four years earlier during the talks on German reunification, and was fulfilled to the letter. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was considered exemplary, as it peacefully resolved the most complex ..read more

For citation, please use: Safranchuk, I.A. and Sushentsov, A.A., 2024. The Intervention That Originated the Post-Cold War Order. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(2), pp. 10–27. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-10-27   The political era that is now coming to an end (or has already ended in some respects) lasted roughly three decades. It runs from the late 1980s, when developments in the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, to the early 2020s, when the Cold War was reincarnated in a new, more intense form. At first, the new period was commonly described in high-flown parlance. The Soviet leadershi ..read more

For citation, please use: Kaspe, S.I., 2024. Global Stasis as a Party System, or Welcome to World Civil War I. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(2), pp. 62–95. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-62-95   “To a mankind that recognizes the equality of man everywhere, every war becomes a civil war.” Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938   Citizens at War The reasoning proposed herein is arranged as a series of successive implications, specifically, “if… then…” logical connectives. Each of them can and should be tested for soundness, criticized, elaborated, and refuted. However, if they are recognized ..read more