What was RAAF Leadership like in No. 75 Squadron at Port Moresby.  We look at the career and Leadership of Squadron Leader John Jackson, a great RAAF pilot who lead from the front.  We look at the tactics that he developed to fight the more agile Japanese Zeroes and what was it that caused him to ignore his own tactics on the day that he was shot down and killed. This is Part 17 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level ..read more

How did the P-40E compare against the Japanese Zero?  We look at how Australia was prepared for the war in the air over Port Moresby.  How well were the pilots prepared and how well was the squadron bought up to operational standard?  This is Part 16 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at the first combats fought over the skies of Port Moresby and how the Squadron Leader of No 75 Squadron ..read more

It was 900 days from the declaration of war against Germany in 1939 to the bombing of Darwin.  When Darwin was bombed, there were no RAAF fighters to defend, and it was three weeks before Darwin was had fighter coverage (and they were US fighters).  We look at how the RAAF was prepared for war, prepared for war for Japan and prepared to defend Australia. This is Part 15 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This ep ..read more

This is Part 14 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at how the Australians and the Japanese generated combined arms on the Kokoda Track. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast ..read more

This is Part 13 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at the tragic friendly fire incident that occured during the Battle of Isurava, where the 2/14th C Company attacked into the Battalion Headquarters.  What were the factors in this and how could it have been avoided? Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details th ..read more

This is Part 12 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The Kokoda Campaign for the Japanese is a manifestation of the effects of the manourvrist approach. We then discuss MAJGEN Basil Morris - at the time he took over command of the 8th Military District he was a substantive Colonel.  We look at the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment for the Kokoda Campaign.  What was the decisive terrain in the Morris ..read more

This is Part 11 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode commences our assessment of the operational level, but before we start, we will look at the psychiatric cost of training and fighting in the jungle.  David Woolley has done an excellent job in documenting issues on the Kokoda Track and suggests some solutions to increasing resilience for troops. We look at what the operational level of war is along with the events w ..read more

This is the third episode in a three part interview with Dr Robert Lyman about 'Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-40', a book he co-wrote with Lord Dannatt, who served as the Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009. This episode looks at how lessons are learnt from victories and defeats and the difficulties in developing doctrine when not in combat.   We discuss the lessons from logistics doctrine development along with why it took so long for doctrine to be combat ready - for the British in was 2nd El Alamein.  Finally we look for the lessons from the interwar perio ..read more

This is the second in a three part interview with Dr Robert Lyman about 'Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-40', a book he co-wrote with Lord Dannatt, who served as the Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009. This episode looks at how the lessons learnt in the victories of 1918 with Combined Arms were forgotten in the interwar period.  Robert discusses the impact of the desire to avoid another Second World War, the resistance to creating an Expeditionary Army for continental Europe, the economy for the Great Depression and the lack of a Grand Strategy and Endstate led to a Bri ..read more

This is the first in a three part interview with Dr Robert Lyman about 'Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-40', a book he cowrote with Lord Dannatt, who served as the Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009. This episode looks at the doctrine development that occurred in the First World War as the British Army developed it's skills in Combined Arms, culminating in the ability to fight and win the battles of the 100 days. We look to answer the question - how does an Army learn to learn, whilst in contact. Check out the show notes for this Professional Military Education podcast for a ..read more