I write on the tax saga of Burt Kroner. The underlying saga goes back many years and has played out in three tax cases. Kroner v. Commissioner (Kroner I), T.C. Memo.  2020-73, here, sustaining the substantial penalty but denying the substantial penalty because of failure to obtain written supervisor approval required by § 6751(b)(1). Kroner v. Commissioner (Kroner II), 48 F.4th 1272 (11th Cir. 2022), here, reversing Kroner I on the § 6751(b) penalty issue (the Tax Court’s sustaining of the deficiency was not appealed); I previously wrote on Kroner II. Eleventh Circuit Makes Clarity from ..read more

In New Jersey v. Mnuchin, ___ F.Supp. 3d ___,  2024 WL 1386080, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59122  (S.D. N.Y. 3/30/24), CL here and GS here, the Court rejected now familiar attacks, including APA and Chevron. This time the attacks come from the states rather than those who fear the administrative fear (either in reality or to stir the base). The complaint of the states (including New York and Connecticut components as named plaintiffs) is that Treasury failed both substantively (improper interpretation a la Chevron) and procedurally in promulgating the Final Rule interpreting § 170 (t ..read more

Readers of this blog interested in Chevron deference should consider the Chevron on Trial Symposium Law Review edition of the George Mason Law Review. See Megan Dill, The George Mason Law Review’s Chevron on Trial Symposium Issue (Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment 4/2/24), here. The N&C article lists and links a number of articles in the Symposium Issue. In the N&C list, I focused principally on Professor Aditya Bamzai’s On the Interpretive Foundations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 31 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 439 (2024), html here and pdf here. I previously blogged on a draft of P ..read more

In Zuch v. Commissioner, ___ F.4th ___, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6827, 2024 WL 1224410 (3rd Cir. 3/22/24), CA3 here and GS temporary * here, the Court starts the opinion of the Court as follows: When Congress grants taxpayers the right to challenge what the Internal Revenue Service says is owed to the government, Congress's will prevails. The IRS cannot say that such a right exists only under the circumstances it prescribes. That ought to go without saying, but this case requires us to say it. This signals that the rest of the opinion is not favorable to the IRS. I infer from Judge Jordan’s W ..read more

In Valley Park Ranch, LLC v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. ___ No. 6 (3/28/24), JAT Google Docs here (GS permalink to follow when available)*, the Court declares the “proceeds” conservation easement regulation invalid by reversing its prior holding in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 180 (2020), aff’d, 28 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2022) and adopting the holding of Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021). The Tax Court gets there with a thin one-judge majority because it drew only 7 agreements with the opinion of the Court (including the author, Judge Jones ..read more

Yesterday, I spoke with a reporter about the effect of reversal or elimination of Chevron deference would have on tax administration. As readers of this blog will know, that issue is now before the Supreme Court in two cases. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (SEC) (Sup. Ct. Dkt. 22-451, here.; and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce (Sup. Ct. Dkt 22-1219, here).  I thought some readers might like to engage with some of the points of the discussion. I will bullet point the key points starting with some predicate points to set up the issue of the effect of reversal or elimination ..read more

The Government has filed a petition for certiorari with the following requested issues (see Petition in Commissioner v. Culp (S. Ct. No. 22-1789), here (Pet. (I): 1. Whether 26 U.S.C. 6213(a) grants the Tax Court jurisdiction to review an untimely petition for redetermination of a tax deficiency? 2. Even assuming that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review some untimely petitions for redetermination of tax deficiencies, whether that jurisdiction extends to a petition filed after the Internal Revenue Service has already assessed the previously determined deficiency, as it is required to do u ..read more

In Kapur v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-28, GS here,  the Court (Judge Pugh) set out the issue as follows (Slip Op. 2, two footnotes omitted):     Before the Court is petitioners' Motion for Protective Order. The parties dispute whether discovery and trial should be limited to a sample of projects at this stage of litigation. We decline to order sampling for the reasons summarized below. n4   n4 This appears to be a recurring issue. See, e.g., Phx. Design Grp., Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 4759-22 (T.C. Aug. 29, 2023) (order); Feller v. Commissioner, No. 11581-20 ..read more

In United States v. Wolin (E.D. N.Y. No. 1:17-CV-02927 Dkt 137 Memo & Order 2/26/24), CL here and GS here, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the Government’s FBAR willful penalty collection suit for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant Greenberg, a recipient of an alleged fraudulent transfer from the person liable for the FBAR penalty. Greenberg’s motion for summary judgment alleged lack of personal jurisdiction. (The CL Docket Entries are here.) Essentially, although Greenberg was a resident of Israel, she maintained sufficient contacts with New York to support jurisdiction. The C ..read more

In United States v. Harrington (D. Colo. No. 1:19-CV-02965 Dkt. #111 Order 2/28/24), here, the Government brought an FBAR willful penalty collection suit against George Harrington, later expanded to include his wife, Monica on fraudulent transfer liability.  The Government sought judgment for the FBAR penalties plus interest and costs (Count One), fraudulent transfer liability against Monica (Count Two), and an order for repatriating sufficient funds necessary to pay the respective liabilities (Count Three).  (The CL docket entries are here.) Count One (FBAR liability) is fairly stra ..read more