It’s widely recognized that CEX/DEX arbitrage trades create a large part of DEX volume, perhaps even the majority of that volume. The Loss Versus Rebalancing (LVR) model stands out as a key tool for quantifying and modeling this arbitrage volume from a theoretical perspective. However, the research focusing on LVR so far has mostly ignored transaction cost as a parameter in CEX/DEX arbitrage. This post aims to extend the LVR model to blockchains such as Ethereum’s mainnet, where CEX/DEX arbitrage transactions are expected to have a significant fixed cost term. It conceptualizes LVR as a quanti ..read more

TLDR L2 neworks such as rollups, validiums and optimiums primarily use execution proofs (ZK proofs or fraud proofs) to prove (or disprove) transaction and state transition validity to the base layer (Ethereum). While proofs of execution are important, they do not detect many categories of faults and frauds that can happen in the various components that comprise the overall layer-2 infrastructure. Such faults/frauds are difficult to prove and impossible to attribute and penalise on-chain. This post introduces integrity proofs, which complements zk proofs and fraud proofs for rollup security. In ..read more

by Wenxuan Deng, Tanisha Katara, David Hamoui and Mateusz Rzeszowski Acknowledgments Additional thanks to Peter Liem for his assistance with data fetching. Also blogged here: polygon mirror; Voter Behavior in Blockchain Governance: A Comparative Study of Curve Finance and Polkadot - HackMD Abstract As the first comprehensive examination of voter behavior in Web3, the following research explores two significant blockchain ecosystems, Curve Finance and Polkadot, using a novel quantitative methodology to decompose and highlight governance patterns. The presented analysis shows, among other findin ..read more

This post starts by analyzing the advantages of consensus and execution block timing games both before and after the ePBS setting, focusing on the preparation time available to the next slot’s proposer/builder for the subsequent slot. We then dissect the dynamics of timing when the builder block reveals, focusing on altruistic, honest, and greedy rational builder rationale. The second half of the post highlights the greedy rational builder’s advantage in controlling the timing of the execution block reveal. Finally, we will list out a series of open questions for further exploration. First, a ..read more

Slashing Proofoor - On-chain slashed validator proofs As of the Dencun hardfork in March 2024, it is possible to prove consensus layer information inside the EVM. This was made possible through EIP-4788, which proposed to make historic beacon block roots available inside the EVM and thereby enable contracts to verify proofs against them. Potential use cases include withdrawal proofs for staking node operators or slashing proofs for restaking protocols. The latter will be the topic of this post/tutorial. Find the code here. EIP-4788 - Beacon block root in the EVM The specification of EIP-4788 ..read more

Axonum Sepolia testnet is undergoing beta testing. Check out our documentation. Introducing Axonum: The Brain of Ethereum Axonum enshrines AI into blockchain to build a decentralized supercomputer powered by global collective intelligence. The Age of AI EVM We are building Axonum, an AI optimistic rollup, with the world’s first AI EVM. We aim to democratize access to AI-powered DApps, making AI model inferences both accessible and user-friendly. Axonum is an optimistic rollup with enshrined AI powered by opML and AI EVM. It enables users to seamlessly employ AI models natively within smart c ..read more

When we finally implements 2D PeerDAS, blob data will be formatted into a data matrix, where each element (aka cell) of the matrix is an array of field elements, with 64 field elements in each array. Peers are required to sample this matrix, with the minimum sampling unit being a cell. For nodes with limited resources, such as light nodes, we may allow them to perform sampling in the following manner: Light node requests: Column index Blob index Field element index within the cell The requested peer’s response: The value of the field element The KZG commitment of the cell polynomial The ..read more

TL;DR In its current form, Ether (ETH) is not a good form of money. This is due to one critical limitation: its value is highly unstable. However, ETH can become stable by adjusting the rewards to validators (and thus the supply of ETH) to changes in demand for ETH. We can target a 0% inflation rate while ensuring validators are paid sufficiently to ensure network security. This new monetary policy can be called Stable Ether Monetary Policy (SEMP). With SEMP, ETH holders would have a great currency, and ETH validators would have exposure to the adoption of ETH. Why should ETH be stable? It is ..read more

Authors: George Spasov (LimeChain), Daniel Ivanov (LimeChain) Thanks for early feedback: Justin Drake (Ethereum Foundation), Brecht Devos (Taiko), Péter Garamvölgyi (Scroll), Simon Brown (Linea), Cooper Kunz (Aztec), Santiago Palladino (Aztec), Nick Dodson (Fuel) This research is only possible thanks to the research grant support from Ethereum Foundation. TLDR Vanilla Based Sequencing is a design for decentralised sequencing mechanism for rollups led by the L1 proposers. Its main goals are: Offer equal if not better UX compared to centralised sequencing in terms of preconfirmation time, guara ..read more

By @Julian, @barnabe and @soispoke Validators are the most decentralized set of participants at any level of the Ethereum protocol and infrastructure. This is a design goal of Ethereum because only then can the protocol leverage this decentralization to obtain protocol resilience: As consensus service participants, a decentralized set of validators ensures resilience against correlated failures, either accidental (e.g., due to bugs taking offline a certain share of the validator set) or malicious (e.g., a share of the validator set producing a safety fault). As block producers, a decentraliz ..read more